The Price of a Transit: Why Seafarers Should Not Have to Choose Between Safety and Their Livelihood

The human cost behind the transit

A transit appears on a voyage plan as a route, a schedule and a commercial commitment. For the people sailing it, passage through a conflict-affected waterway can mean something altogether different: uncertainty about returning home, fear for colleagues, and a decision carrying consequences for family income. No freight calculation can capture that burden. Seafarers are civilian workers, not expendable instruments of energy security.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis makes that distinction impossible to ignore. In its statement of 28 August 2026, the IMO described seafarers living and working under heightened risk and uncertainty and called for practical solutions and renewed cooperation to restore freedom of navigation. That is dated context, not a claim about today’s security conditions. It nevertheless exposes the human reality behind discussions framed only around disrupted supply. Source: https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/statement-on-the-ongoing-crisis-in-the-strait-of-hormuz.aspx (opens in a new tab)

This editorial was inspired by an original public post from Captain Alexandros Lignos: https://lnkd.in/p/d7ivnHP4 (opens in a new tab). The conclusions are MyLNG’s, not attributed to him. We do not rely on unverified company bonus figures, privately circulated messages or allegations against named operators. The question is broader and more important: what should responsible shipping require when safety and livelihood appear to collide?

IBF entitlements are not discretionary bonuses

Precision matters. On 5 March 2026, the ITF reported that the IBF parties had designated the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and Persian Gulf as a Warlike Operations Area. Its announcement explicitly concerned seafarers serving on vessels covered by IBF agreements. These arrangements must not be presented as a universal benefit applying to every seafarer or vessel. Source: https://www.itfglobal.org/en/news/itf-condemns-killing-and-targeting-innocent-civilian-seafarers-strait-hormuz-designated (opens in a new tab)

For covered seafarers within or entering the designated area, the announcement specified a bonus equal to 100% of basic wage, payable for a minimum of five days and for each additional day the vessel remains in the area. It also specified doubled compensation for death and disability arising from incidents in the area, and a right to refuse entry with repatriation at the company’s cost and compensation equal to two months’ basic wage.

Those are agreed protections, not a discretionary gesture of generosity. A separate company incentive may have different eligibility conditions and should be identified separately. Calling everything a “war bonus” blurs the distinction between an applicable entitlement and an optional payment, making it harder for a crew member to understand what is actually owed.

The announcement said the designation would remain under regular review. Readers must check the applicable collective agreement, vessel coverage and designation in force for their particular voyage; the March announcement alone does not establish the position on every later date. Nor does compensation establish that a passage is safe. Money responds to exposure and consequences. It cannot remove a missile threat, repair a security assurance or replace a realistic assessment.

A right to refuse must be usable without coercion

An option written into an agreement has little value if exercising it means humiliation, pressure from colleagues or fear of losing future employment. MyLNG’s editorial position is that refusal must be handled as a legitimate safety decision, not evidence of disloyalty. That is a standard we advocate, not an allegation that a particular operator has breached it.

For covered seafarers, the March IBF announcement provides a concrete refusal and repatriation framework. For others, rights and remedies require examination of the relevant employment terms, collective arrangements and applicable law. No generic article can promise an identical entitlement to everyone. But every operator can communicate clearly, allow confidential questions and explain how a decision will be recorded and acted upon.

Timing is critical. Presenting a choice only when a ship is approaching the area can make a formal option practically unusable. Crew need information while alternatives can still be arranged. Repatriation planning should address realistic transport and security constraints, rather than assuming a ticket alone resolves the problem. A worker should not have to gamble with personal safety to preserve access to the next contract.

The company and master cannot outsource the risk

The IMO Secretary-General’s statement of 9 June 2026 was direct: seafarers must not be exposed to known, significant risks clearly beyond mitigation, and commercial or operational considerations cannot justify that danger. It identified the master and company as bearing ultimate responsibility for voyage planning and thorough, realistic risk assessments under established safety and security management frameworks. Source: https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/statement-no-safe-passage-strait-of-hormuz.aspx (opens in a new tab)

That statement addressed conditions at the time. It is not a permanent declaration that every future transit is prohibited, nor a substitute for current intelligence and vessel-specific assessment. Its principle remains important: commercial urgency is not a mitigation measure. Neither a charter deadline nor a willing signature establishes that an unacceptable risk has become acceptable.

Responsibility also requires shore support. The master must not be left to reconcile contradictory commercial and safety pressures alone. In MyLNG’s view, decisions need a documented basis, meaningful alternatives and a clear route for escalation. Crew consent does not discharge the company’s responsibilities, and a bonus does not transfer those responsibilities to the people on board.

LNG competence is specific, not interchangeable

Replacing a crew member who declines entry is not simply a matter of filling a berth. LNG operations demand competence appropriate to assigned duties and familiarity with the actual ship. Cargo containment, gas-handling arrangements, machinery interfaces and emergency procedures differ between vessels. A relief plan needs to account for those differences, not just the availability of a certificate holder.

The IMO describes STCW as establishing minimum international standards for training, certification and watchkeeping. Its overview identifies special training requirements for personnel serving on certain ship types and amendments concerning liquefied gas tankers. The Convention and Code form a baseline; this overview is not a complete checklist for an individual appointment. Source: https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/STCW-Conv-LINK.aspx (opens in a new tab)

MyLNG’s operational argument is straightforward: verify the qualifications required for the assigned role, then assess relevant experience and ship-specific readiness. Credentials, experience and familiarisation answer different questions. None should be treated as a convenient substitute for the others when relief is arranged under pressure.

Cross-training is valuable; it does not erase an experience gap

Cross-training can widen career opportunities and strengthen resilience. It should not be dismissed merely because an officer’s previous service was on another tanker type. Equally, experience in one cargo system does not automatically establish competence in another. A structured transition needs an honest assessment of what transfers and what must be learned.

That means supervised exposure, suitable training and demonstrated understanding of the systems the person will operate. Readiness must match the specific duties assigned. This is an editorial recommendation, not a universal training duration or an invented regulatory requirement.

A replacement strategy that ignores that distinction risks solving a scheduling problem by creating an operational one. Respecting a refusal right and maintaining a competent crew are connected responsibilities. Operators should plan for both, rather than presenting them as competing priorities.

Accelerated promotion needs evidence of readiness

Promotion can be deserved and timely. Speed alone is not proof of poor judgement, but neither should an urgent vacancy become the only reason to assign greater responsibility. The change from supporting an operation to directing it requires more than confidence: it requires readiness for decisions, escalation and coordination under abnormal conditions.

For LNG service, vessel familiarisation should be a meaningful process rather than a hurried signature. MyLNG advocates a planned handover, access to relevant procedures and a documented assessment of readiness for assigned duties. Where experience gaps remain, supervision and support should be explicit. We prescribe no universal number of days; adequacy depends on the role, vessel and person.

A crisis should increase scrutiny of readiness, not lower it. Career development must build capability, not transfer unaddressed organisational risks to a newly promoted person.

Practical accountability an operator can demonstrate

Accountability begins with answers a crew can understand: which agreement covers the vessel, which designation applies, what payments are entitlements, and how refusal and repatriation work. These should be communicated in writing before the decision becomes urgent, with access to appropriate union or independent advice where available.

It continues with a credible risk decision. MyLNG recommends identifying who assessed the voyage, what information was used, which mitigations are achievable and which alternatives were considered. The assessment should be revisited as conditions change. Uncertainty should be recorded honestly rather than concealed behind assurances that cannot be supported.

Relief and promotion decisions also deserve an auditable rationale: qualifications checked, relevant experience assessed, handover completed and remaining limitations addressed. Support should extend to welfare communication, realistic travel arrangements and a confidential way to raise concerns. These are practical editorial recommendations, not a claim that the cited sources mandate every listed step.

Accountability means a seafarer can question a passage and receive a workable response without becoming the perceived obstacle to a commercial plan.

No transit is worth making a livelihood conditional on danger

Shipping depends on people whose judgement, competence and endurance keep complex vessels operating. Their contribution cannot be honoured in public and discounted when a schedule becomes difficult. Compensation matters, contractual protections matter, and responsible preparation matters. None turns a human life into an acceptable line item.

The industry should reject the false choice between protecting trade and protecting crews. Safe decisions, respected rights and competent staffing are conditions of responsible trade. When risks cannot credibly be mitigated, the answer is not to find a more persuasive bonus or a more vulnerable replacement. It is to confront the voyage decision itself.

A seafarer’s livelihood should never depend on silence about danger. The price of a transit must not be the abandonment of that principle.

Sources and editorial scope

ITF, 5 March 2026 — IBF Warlike Operations Area designation and entitlements for covered seafarers: https://www.itfglobal.org/en/news/itf-condemns-killing-and-targeting-innocent-civilian-seafarers-strait-hormuz-designated (opens in a new tab)

IMO, 9 June 2026 — voyage risk assessment and the priority of seafarer safety: https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/statement-no-safe-passage-strait-of-hormuz.aspx (opens in a new tab)

IMO, 28 August 2026 — dated context on the ongoing Strait of Hormuz crisis: https://www.imo.org/en/mediacentre/pressbriefings/pages/statement-on-the-ongoing-crisis-in-the-strait-of-hormuz.aspx (opens in a new tab)

IMO, STCW Convention overview — training, certification and watchkeeping framework: https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/STCW-Conv-LINK.aspx (opens in a new tab)

Captain Alexandros Lignos, original public post — inspiration only, not primary evidence for this editorial’s conclusions: https://lnkd.in/p/d7ivnHP4 (opens in a new tab)

This is an editorial, not legal advice, voyage approval or an assessment of any named company. The primary sources were checked on 14 October 2026. Dated security statements and designation announcements must be read in their original context; current contractual and operational decisions require current information.